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Recommendations for properly conducted lineup identification tasks
Abstract
An eyewitness takes the stand and describes salient aspects of an event that he or she witnessed several
months earlier. Then, in the hush of the courtroom, points to the defendant and says “That's him. That's the
man I saw.” Simple, clean, and convincing. And therein rests the problem; what appears to be a simple
identification is in fact the result of a series of complex and potentially unreliable social and cognitive events
that began unfolding several months earlier when the event was originally witnessed.
This chapter, and much of the empirical research on which it is based, operates on an assumption that there
are two sources of unreliability in eyewitness accounts. First, there are some inherent limitations in human
information processing. These limitations exist at sensory levels (for example, Sperling, 1960), attentional
levels (for example, Broadbent, 1958; Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; Triesman, 1964), and memory levels (for
example, Miller, 1956; Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). But inaccuracies in eyewitness accounts are not entirely
attributable to human imperfections in sensation, perception, and memory. The second source of inaccuracy
in eyewitness accounts can be attributed to the methods the justice system uses to obtain information from
eyewitnesses. The work of Elizabeth Loftus on the effects of misleading questions serves to make this point
(see Loftus, 1979; and this volume). The account one gets from an eyewitness depends very much on the
methods used to solicit the information.
The study of how to improve eyewitness accuracy by manipulating the methods used to obtain information
from eyewitnesses is known as a systemvariable approach to eyewitness research (Wells, 1978).
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An eyewitness takes the stand and describes salient aspects of an event that 
he or she witnessed several months earlier. Then, in the hush of the court-
room, points to the defendant and says "That's him. That's the man I saw." 
Simple, clean, and convincing. And therein rests the problem; what appears 
to be a simple identification is in fact the result of a series of complex and 
potentially unreliable social and cognitive events that began unfolding several 
months earlier when the event was originally witnessed. 
This chapter, and much of the empirical research on which it is based, 
operates on an assumption that there are two sources of unreliability in eye-
witness accounts. First, there are some inherent limitations in human infor-
mation processing. These limitations exist at sensory levels (for example, 
Sperling, 1960), attentional levels (for example, Broadbent, 1958; Deutsch 
& Deutsch, 1963; Triesman, 1964), and memory levels (for example, Miller, 
1956; Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). But inaccuracies in eyewitness accounts are 
not entirely attributable to human imperfections in sensation, perception, and 
memory. The second source of inaccuracy in eyewitness accounts can be 
attributed to the methods the justice system uses to obtain information from 
eyewitnesses. The work of Elizabeth Loftus on the effects of misleading 
questions serves to make this point (see Loftus, 1979; and this volume). The 
account one gets from an eyewitness depends very much on the methods used 
to solicit the information. 
The study of how to improve eyewitness accuracy by manipulating the 
methods used to obtain information from eyewitnesses is known as a system-
variable approach to eyewitness research (Wells, 1978). Unlike studies of the 
inherent deficiencies of eyewitnesses, system-variable research can inform us 
of ways to improve the accuracy of eyewitness accounts. The purpose of this 
chapter is to review what we have learned about the best ways to obtain 
eyewitness identifications. Our concern is with how to minimize false iden-
tification rates and maximize accurate identification rates. 
Portions of this chapter were supported by a grant to the first author from the National 
Science Foundation (#SES-9022182). 
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We begin with the assumption that there is an identification problem. Wells 
(1992) argued that there are three observations consistent with this assump-
tion. First, a large number of experiments using simulated or staged crime 
methods have found that false identifications occur with surprisingly high 
frequency (for example, Brigham & Cairns, 1988; Brigham, Maass, & Snyder, 
1982; Buckhout, 1974; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987; Davies, Ellis, & 
Shepherd, 1978; Ellis, Shepherd, & Davies, 1980; Leippe, Wells, & Ostrom, 
1979; Lindsay, 1986; Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Lindsay & Wells, 1985; Lindsay, 
Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Loftus & Greene, 1980; Malpass & Devine, 1981; 
Parker & Caranza, 1989; Shepherd, Ellis, & Davies, 1982; Wells, 1984; Wells, 
Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981; Wells & Leippe, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Fer-
guson, 1979). Second, there is considerable research evidence indicating that 
there is a "sincerity" to most of the false identifications observed in these 
experiments; the eyewitnesses often seem actually to believe that their false 
identifications are in fact accurate identifications. They express considerable 
levels of subjective confidence in their identifications and give testimony in 
a persuasive fashion (for example, see Deffenbacher, 1980; Leippe, 1980; 
Luus & Wells, 1992; Murray & Wells, 1982; Wells & Murray, 1984). Third, 
analyses of over a thousand actual cases of wrongful convictions have revealed 
that eyewitness error was the single largest factor leading to these miscarriages 
of justice (see Borchard, 1932; Frank & Frank, 1957; Brandon & Davies, 
1973; Huff, Ratner, & Sagarin, 1986). 
These three observations, two of which are based on experimental research 
and one on case studies, lead us to believe that there is in fact an important 
problem to be addressed. Our attempt to address the eyewitness identification 
problem is guided in a general sense by the system variable approach described 
earlier. In this chapter we go one step further by proposing a theoretical 
framework followed by a set of specific recommendations for the best ways 
to conduct identification tasks. 
It might be fair to argue that the eyewitness identification process has not 
yet been described in a coherent theoretical framework. (By eyewitness iden-
tification process we mean the social and cognitive processes involved in the 
eyewitness's decision to identify or not identify a particular member of a 
lineup. 1) We attempt to rectify that deficiency here by showing how we may 
be able to tie together a number of empirical observations by reference to a 
small number of propositions and corollaries. We admit from the outset that 
the result is not a true theory in the sense that a strict theoretician might use 
the term. Nevertheless, we present what we think is a useful framework for 
the understanding, prediction, and control of the eyewitness identification 
process. By pointing out how each recommendation is related back to a 
proposition or corollary, we hope to show that these recommendations are 
not just a haphazard collection of observations but instead are parts of an 
interrelated framework. 
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Propositions 
Our recommendations on how to properly conduct a lineup are tied together 
by an interrelated set of two propositions and a major corollary. In some 
cases the recommendations are derivations from the propositions. In other 
cases, recommendations represent hypotheses that have been tested empir-
ically. The empirical tests of these hypotheses in turn reflect back on the 
plausibility of the propositions and the corollary. In this section, we introduce 
the two propositions and the corollary. 
Proposition I: The purpose of a lineup is to uncover information in an eye-
witness's recognition memory that was not available in recall. (Luus & Wells, 
1991) 
The general truth value of Proposition I is self-evident. If it were the case 
that an eyewitness's verbal description of a culprit were sufficiently diagnostic 
of the identity of the culprit, then why would a lineup be conducted at all? 
In relatively rare cases, a verbal description has this level of diagnostic value. 
For instance suppose an eyewitness describes a culprit as a Caucasian male, 
about five feet tall, with a tattoo on his left hand that says "War is Hell," a 
two-inch scar over his left eye that is shaped like a pear, and a missing eye 
tooth on the left top side. If the police find a suspect with exactly these 
features, would a lineup be necessary? No. We conduct lineups because verbal 
descriptions typically do not contain a level of information that allows us to 
definitely decide whether our suspect is the culprit or not. 
The idea that there is information in eyewitnesses' recognition memories 
that is not verbally recallable is consistent with the empirical observation that 
there is little statistical relation between various measures of verbal recall for 
faces (for example, accuracy, fluency, consistency, completeness) and rec-
ognition accuracy (for example, Pigott & Brigham, 1985; Wells, 1985). Sta-
tistically, this means that recall and recognition for faces account for different 
aspects of the variance in accuracy. 
A derivation from Proposition I says that the diagnostic value of conducting 
a lineup increases as the diagnostic value of an obtained verbal description 
decreases. In other words, if the eyewitness's description is especially useless 
(the witness can only say that the culprit was a male of average height with 
medium-length hair), a lineup must be conducted to see if the witness can 
further reduce that uncertainty by identifying a particular suspect. If that 
uncertainty has already been reduced to near zero based only on the witness's 
verbal description, then a lineup task is not likely to further reduce our 
uncertainty. 
Although the plausibility of Proposition I is somewhat self-evident, it is 
surprising to us how little this proposition has been exploited in certain do-
mains, especially as it relates to the question of how distractors in lineups 
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should be selected. As we describe later in connection with our recommen-
dations for selecting distractors, a good distractor is one who fits the verbal 
description but varies in appearance from the suspect on features that were 
not a part of that description. This derivation is qualitatively and importantly 
different from the simple idea that distractors should look like the suspect 
but not too much like the suspect. We reject the latter idea as rather useless 
in a practical sense as well as imprecise; it is misleading and unnecessarily 
damaging to the overall value of the lineup to follow such a strategy. 
Proposition II: The identification process is governed not only by simple me-
morial factors but also by extramemorial judgment and heuristic processes. 
If proposition II were not true, and identification were a pure and simple 
memory process, we would not care about certain methods of conducting 
identification tasks. For example, what would it matter if the police told the 
eyewitness prior to viewing a lineup that person number three is the suspect 
and the remaining lineup members are actually police officers? Presumably, 
this would put considerable social pressure on the eyewitness to identify 
person number three. The eyewitness would know the police want a positive 
identification of person number three and must decide whether or not to give 
them the response they want. This is a way of saying that an eyewitness's 
identification decision is just that; it is a decision. Like all decisions, it can 
be said to be preceded by a set of judgments. Some of these judgments are 
perceptual or memorial but are based on external sources of information, 
social pressures, inferences, and heuristic processes. 
One of these heuristics is the relative judgment heuristic (Wells, 1984). The 
relative judgment heuristic is a strategy for making a positive identification 
in which the eyewitness chooses the lineup member who most closely resem-
bles the culprit relative to the other lineup members. Like other heuristics, 
the relative judgment heuristic works very well under one set of conditions 
but leads to error under another. The problem arises when people cannot or 
do not distinguish between conditions where the heuristic is functional and 
conditions where it is dysfunctional. In the case of the relative judgment 
heuristic, it is marvelously efficient and productive when a lineup contains 
the actual culprit, but it is dangerous and damaging when it does not. As will 
be evident later in this chapter, the relative judgment heuristic has led to 
some testable derivations for improving lineup procedures. 
Corollary to Proposition II: A lineup task can be likened to a social psychology 
experiment: Factors that can confound the interpretation of an experimental 
outcome can similarly confound the interpretation of the outcome of a lineup 
task. 
Our corollary can be thought of as a simple analogy between the set of 
rules that describe a good design and procedure for conducting an experiment 
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on the one hand, and the set of rules that would describe a good design and 
procedure for conducting a lineup on the other .2 In this sense our corollary 
is relatively powerful because it draws on a large and respected body of 
literature on experimental research methods and sources of threat to validity 
(for example, Aronson & Carlsmith, 1968; Rosenthal, 1976). 
For example, we know from the logic of experimental procedure that a 
researcher should not reveal the research hypothesis to the subject until all 
the relevant data are collected. Analogously, if an eyewitness identifies some-
one from a lineup, the lineup administrator should not tell the witness whether 
the identified person was the suspect (versus one of the distractors) if he still 
expects to get a meaningful answer to the question of how confident the 
witness is in his or her identification. Any lineup administrator who leaks the 
hypothesis (for example, that number three in the lineup is the culprit) and 
then collects additional data from the eyewitness has contaminated the mean-
ing of those data. They should thereby be rejected just as surely as any 
experimenter's data that rested on a similar error should be rejected. 
Some fundamental distinctions and assumptions 
A lineup might or might not contain the actual culprit. If one thinks of a 
lineup as an array of persons that includes the culprit, and the task of the 
eyewitness as one of finding the culprit among the array, one is depicting the 
situation in a limited and ecologically invalid manner. In actual cases, as well 
as in our experiments, the culprit is absent from the lineup on at least some 
occasions. For instance, in actual cases the police might have arrested an 
innocent suspect and the actual culprit is still at large. We use the terms 
"culprit present" and "culprit absent" to distinguish between these two states 
of affairs. The consequences of being in the culprit-present state versus the 
culprit-absent state are enormously different. Because we cannot be certain 
in actual cases whether or not the lineup includes the culprit, any claim for 
a superior lineup identification procedure must be tested under both possible 
states. 
A distinction must also be made between culprits, suspects, and distractors.3 
A suspect is one who is merely suspected of being the culprit, but might in 
fact be innocent. Hence, when we refer to the identification of a suspect we 
do not mean that this is an accurate identification; we mean only that the 
eyewitness identified the lineup member whom the police suspect is the culprit. 
A distractor is not a suspect. A distractor is a member of the lineup who is 
known to be innocent of the offense in question. A distractor might be a 
police officer, someone from a jail cell, or a citizen of the community. If an 
eyewitness identifies a distractor, the identification is readily dismissed ("I'm 
sorry Mrs. Miller, but you identified someone who was in a jail cell at the 
time you were robbed"). 
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With these distinctions in mind, we now impose an assumption. The as-
sumption is that a lineup is composed of only one suspect (who might or 
might not be the culprit) and the remaining lineup members are innocent 
distractors. This assumption is not fully grounded in police practices. Wells 
and Turtle (1986) reported that perhaps as many as one of every three police 
lineups fails to use distractors but instead uses several suspects. The dangers 
of this practice in terms of controlling false identification rates have been 
documented and will not be reviewed in detail here (see Wells & Turtle, 
1986). Suffice it to note for current purposes that the likelihood of false 
identification is additive across the number of suspects in a lineup and that 
the failure to use innocent distractors in a lineup is akin to giving the witness 
a multiple-choice test in which there can be no wrong answer. Using distractors 
known to be innocent, on the other hand, allows the police to use a "grading 
key" of sorts; if a distractor is identified, the identification can clearly be 
classified as an error and the eyewitness can justifiably be discredited to some 
extent. 
Finally, we distinguish between an identification error and a false identi-
fication. Although a false identification is an error and an error is a false 
response, we reserve the term false identification for instances in which the 
eyewitness identifies an innocent suspect; if the eyewitness identifies a dis-
tractor we call this a foil identification or distractor identification. As already 
noted, the consequences of identifying a distractor versus a suspect are pro-
foundly different. The former would never result in charges being brought 
against the identified person whereas the latter usually would. 
An integration of these distinctions and assumptions allows us to state that 
a false identification cannot occur when the actual culprit is a member of the 
lineup. This follows from our definition of a false identification (identification 
of an innocent suspect) in conjunction with the assumption that the lineup 
contains only one suspect. Conversely, false identifications can occur only 
when the lineup does not contain the actual culprit. Identification errors (that 
is, distractor identifications), on the other hand, can occur in either a culprit-
present or a culprit-absent lineup. 
Recommendations on conducting lineups 
Having stated our basic propositions, assumptions, and distinctions, we are 
now prepared to state our recommendations. Each recommendation is ac-
companied by discussion of its relation to one of the two general propositions 
and, whenever possible, to empirical data supporting the recommendation. 
We have organized these recommendations according to the order we think 
the relevant issue would arise when someone is considering conducting a 
lineup in a given case. 
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Recommendation 1: Verbal descriptions of the culprit should be obtained from 
all eyewitnesses prior to conducting a lineup. As will be noted in greater detail 
later, verbal descriptions of the culprit are essential to making decisions about 
the selection of appropriate distractors. In general terms, Recommendation 
1 follows from the logic of our first proposition, namely that the purpose of 
a lineup is to uncover information from a recognition memory task that was 
not available in recall. There are other forensically relevant reasons for this 
rather obvious recommendation. For example, if the eyewitness is ever 
brought into court to testify about the witnessed event, she or he will be 
asked to describe the culprit from memory. If a prelineup description was 
not obtained earlier one cannot be sure whether the verbal description is 
being retrieved from the original event or if it is merely a description of the 
person the witness identified in the lineup. Only if there is a record of what 
the witness recalled about the culprit prior to viewing the lineup can we be 
certain about how to interpret the witness's in-court description. 
Recommendation 2: A lineup should contain at least five appropriate distractors 
for every one suspect. We define later what makes a distractor "appropriate." 
The purpose of this recommendation is to set a minimum standard for the 
number of distractors. The number five is somewhat arbitrary in the same 
sense that the number six for a minimum sized jury is arbitrary. There is no 
threshold number below which the dangers of false identification are signif-
icant and above which they are not. On the other hand, there are clear 
theoretical arguments about the rate at which false identifications can be 
expected to decline as a function of the ratio of distractors to innocent suspects 
(see Doob & Kirshenbaum, 1973; Lindsay & Wells, 1980; Wells, in press). 
The decline in false identification rates as a function of the number of good 
distractors should be a diminishing return function. That is, adding a good 
distractor when there are only two other good distractors should have more 
impact than adding a good distractor when there are six or ten other good 
distractors. 
The only empirical data bearing directly on the question of how many good 
distractors should be used in a lineup or photo spread comes from a study 
by Nosworthy and Lindsay (1990). Their data indicate that the addition of 
good distractors beyond a nominal size of three provides little or no additional 
protection for an innocent suspect. We note, however, that Nosworthy and 
Lindsay's study selected "good" distractors by using a resemblance-to-suspect 
criterion rather than a match-to-description criterion. This might have im-
plications for the shape of the function relating the number of good distractors 
to the risk of false identifications of the suspect. 
A critical element of Recommendation 2 is that it specifies a ratio of suspects 
to distractors rather than a ratio of suspects to total lineup members. Recall 
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that a distractor is a lineup member known to be innocent. Hence, suspects 
cannot count as distractors for other suspects. For example, if there are two 
people suspected of being the culprit in question and the police want to 
conduct a single lineup containing both suspects, each suspect would have to 
have five separate distractors, resulting in a total of ten distractors. Counting 
the two suspects, this lineup would have a minimum number of twelve mem-
bers. 
Readers are referred to Wells and Turtle (1986) for a more thorough treat-
ment of the problem of the ratio of suspects to distractors. In general, we 
agree with Wells and Turtle that a lineup should have only one suspect with 
the remaining members being innocent distractors. We have worded Rec-
ommendation 2, however, to accommodate the practical concern that it might 
be difficult or perhaps impossible to narrow the range of suspects to only one 
in a given real-world case. We see no room to compromise on the fact that 
an adequate ratio of suspects to distractors is critical in controlling the rate 
of false identifications. This point becomes more obvious when we consider 
the case of an all-suspect (no distractor) lineup. Suppose there were six sus-
pects and each served as a foil for the others. Suppose now that the eyewitness 
makes a random choice for his or her identification. In this case chances are 
at least five in six that the identification would be a false identification. 4 If 
there were only one suspect and the other five were distractors, however, the 
chance of a false identification from this, a mere guessing strategy, falls to 
one in six or less. 5 The remaining five chances out of six represent identification 
errors, but they are identifications of innocent people who are not at risk of 
false accusation, and thereby need not fear being charged with the offense. 
Recommendation 3: Distractors should be chosen to match the eyewitness's 
verbal description of the culprit. This follows from Proposition I, which states 
that the purpose of the lineup is to uncover information from recognition 
memory that was not available in verbal recall. If the suspect is the only one 
who matches the witness's verbal description, the lineup (recognition) task 
cannot be said to serve the function stated in our first proposition. Specifically, 
under such conditions we cannot determine whether an identification of the 
suspect was something that went beyond what the witness was already able 
to report (that is, the witness relied on the earlier description) or whether 
we actually have a process of recognition that went beyond the recall level. 
Recommendation 3 has received wide attention among eyewitness identi-
fication researchers. Doob and Kirshenbaum (1973) and Malpass (1981) have 
written extensively about this problem and there are empirical data showing 
how the innocent suspect is protected (without significant loss in rates of 
identifying the actual culprit) by following Recommendation 3 (see Lindsay 
& Wells, 1980; Wells, Seelau, & Rydell, 1992). Wells et al. (1978) as well as 
Malpass (1981) and Malpass and Devine (1983, 1984) have proposed ways to 
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measure the extent to which Recommendation 3 has been effectively met in 
a given case. 
Recommendation 3 follows not only from Proposition I but also from Prop-
osition II and its corollary. Previous writings have almost exclusively treated 
the idea in Recommendation 3 as an issue of extramemorial influences on 
the judgment and decision processes of eyewitnesses. Wells and Luus (1990), 
for example, argued that violations of Recommendation 3 allow the eye-
witness to discern the hypothesis of the police, thus placing social pressures 
on the witness to choose the only person who matches the description. 
Recommendation 3a: In cases where the eyewitness's description of the culprit 
does not match the suspect's appearance, the suspect's appearance on the dis-
crepant feature(s) should be used rather than the eyewitness's description of 
that (those) feature(s). A discrepancy between the eyewitness's description of 
the culprit and the appearance of the suspect is not unusual. This could happen 
for three reasons. First, the suspect might not be the culprit. Second, the 
eyewitness's description might include errors of recall. Third, the suspect 
might be the culprit and the eyewitness's description might be accurate, but 
the culprit might have altered his or her appearance between the time of the 
witnessed event and the lineup. Recommendation 3a states that the suspect's 
actual appearance on the discrepant feature(s) constitutes the default de-
scriptor for selecting distractors. This strikes us as the only viable solution to 
the suspect-description discrepancy. If one were to select distractors who 
match the description when the suspect does not match the description, then 
the suspect might stand out as being distinctive in the set of lineup members. 
It is important to note, however, that the suspect's appearance on given 
features is used as the default only for those features on which there is a 
discrepancy between the witness's description and the suspect's appearance. 
Recommendation 4: The set of potential distractors who match the description 
should exceed the number of distractors needed so that any who show undue 
resemblance to the suspect can be discarded from the set that is used. This is 
our most controversial recommendation and, as far as we know, has never 
been advocated in print. Hence, we will take extra care to document its 
rationale. 
Recommendation 4 follows generally from our first proposition, that the 
purpose of a lineup is to uncover information in recognition memory not 
available in recall. The theoretical underpinnings for Recommendation 4 can 
be found in Luus and Wells's (1991) article on strategies for selecting dis-
tractors for lineups. Here, however, we have taken their developments one 
step further. 
The general idea behind discarding distractors who too closely resemble 
the suspect is to allow the eyewitness greater levels of perceptual discrimi-
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Table 11.1. Hypothetical set of four lineup members who match the 
eyewitness's description but vary on nondescribed features 
Person A Person B Person C Person D 
Features part of male male male male 
eyewitness's description Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian Caucasian 
of culprit 5' 10''-6' 5'10"-6' 5' 10''-6' 5' 10''-6' 
170-175 lbs 170-175 lbs 170-175 lbs 170-175 lbs 
mustache mustache mustache mustache 
short hair short hair short hair short hair 
brown hair brown hair brown hair brown hair 
30-35 yrs old 30-35 yrs old 30-35 yrs old 30-35 yrs old 
Features not part of curly hair straight hair wavy hair wavy hair 
eyewitness's description round chin square chin round chin angular chin 
of culprit blue eyes green eyes brown eyes blue-green eyes 
bushy brow average brow thin brow thick brow 
round eyes squinty eyes normal eyes squinty eyes 
nation among the lineup members. It is critical to keep in mind, however, 
that the remaining distractors must still match the description of the culprit 
as recalled by the eyewitness. Hence, Recommendation 4 in no sense violates 
Recommendation 3, nor in any sense should it produce a bias against the 
suspect. 
Recommendation 4 is an attempt to increase propitious heterogeneity (help-
ful differences) in the appearance of lineup members so that the guilty suspect 
stands out for the witness but an innocent suspect would not. In general, 
variation in appearance across lineup members is not inherently bad unless 
that variation leads to bias against the innocent suspect. Those who have 
argued that a good lineup is one in which the distractors are selected to 
resemble the suspect have been promoting a fallacious strategy logic. Dis-
tractors must match the witness's description of the culprit, but no further 
protection to the innocent suspect is logically or theoretically gained by press-
ing for additional similarity. Instead, the practice of going beyond the witness-
description criterion serves merely to reduce propitious heterogeneity and, 
in effect, protect the guilty suspect. 
Potential resistance among psychologists to the idea of maximizing propi-
tious heterogeneity might stem from disbelief that increasing differences in 
the appearance of lineup members can be done without prejudicing responses 
against an innocent suspect. We offer Table 11.1 as an illustration of our 
point that heterogeneity per se is not tantamount to increased risk of an 
innocent suspect being identified. In this example, the eyewitness described 
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the culprit as a Caucasian male, about thirty or thirty-five years old, with 
short brown hair and a mustache, five feet, ten inches to six feet tall, and 
weighing one hundred seventy to one hundred seventy-five pounds. No other 
information could be recalled. Notice that each of the four lineup members 
matches this description, thereby satisfying Recommendation 3. Should we 
go further to make certain that the distractors also match the suspect on 
additional features such as eye color, shape of chin, and so on? We argue 
that one should not try to match these additional features. As evidence that 
this hypothetical four-person lineup in Table 11.1 is not biased against an 
innocent suspect, we ask at this point that the reader try to guess which person 
(A, B, C, or D) is the suspect. Notice there is no way for the reader to make 
this determination. That is exactly our point. If only one of the four members 
matched the eyewitness's description on the above-the-line features in Table 
11.1, then it would be possible to deduce (using only the description) which 
lineup member is the suspect. But variation below the line in Table 11.1 does 
not allow such deductions. 
Hence, the only reason the eyewitness should prefer one lineup member 
(member B, for instance) over the others is if that lineup member is the culprit 
or by chance happens to look like the culprit on the features that were not 
part of the description. But each lineup member has an equal a priori like-
lihood of looking like the culprit by mere chance on the nonrecalled features. 
Thus, there is no bias against the suspect. 
How would we know if an attempt to achieve propitious hetereogeneity 
somehow inadvertently created a malevolent form of heterogeneity that 
biased the lineup against the suspect? Luus and Wells (1991) argued that a 
lineup must still pass tests of having adequate functional size. Readers are 
referred to the chapter by Brigham and Pfeifer (this volume) for a discussion 
of the methods for measuring functional size and related measures of the 
fairness of a lineup. 
We put our theory of propitious hetereogeneity to the test in a recent 
experiment (Wells et al., 1992). We staged thefts for 252 unsuspecting eye-
witnesses in groups of two to four in size. There were seven different thieves 
(thirty-six witnesses per thief) that varied in appearance (two were African 
American, one was Asian, four were Caucasian; four were female, three were 
male). Witnesses were separated immediately after the theft and asked to 
provide a written description of the thief. Eyewitnesses were randomly as-
signed to one of three conditions: (1) A low functional size lineup was con-
structed in which only the suspect matched the eyewitness's description; (2) 
a lineup was constructed in which the distractors were chosen to be similar 
in appearance to the suspect; (3) a lineup was constructed in which distractors 
matched the eyewitness's description but were otherwise dissimilar to the 
suspect. Half of the eyewitnesses in each lineup condition viewed a lineup 
containing the actual thief and half viewed a lineup in which an innocent 
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Table 11.2. Percentage of witnesses making correct and incorrect decisions 
as a function of strategy used for constructing lineups 
Low functional 
size Resemble suspect Match-to-description 
Accurate identifications 
Thief present 71.4 21.4 66.7 
Thief absent x x x 
False identifications 
Thief present x x x 
Thief absent 42.9 11.9 11.9 
Distractor identification 
Thief present 7.1 42.9 7.1 
Thief absent 11.9 47.6 31.0 
"Not there" 
Thief present 14.3 28.6 11.9 
Thief absent 31.0 21.4 31.0 
"Don't know" 
Thief present 7.1 7.1 14.2 
Thief absent 14.2 19.0 26.2 
X = cannot occur. 
suspect replaced the thief. Eyewitnesses were told that the actual thief might 
or might not be present. 
The data in Table 11.2 show a clear pattern. Accurate identifications were 
equally high for the low functional size and match-to-description lineups and 
both were significantly higher than the resemble-suspect lineup. The impor-
tant point, however, is that the match-to-description strategy held false iden-
tification rates down to the same low level that the resemble-suspect strategy 
was able to achieve. 
The strategy of selecting distractors who match the eyewitness's description 
of the culprit but otherwise do not resemble him or her is an effective strategy 
for holding false identification rates down to a level comparable to that in 
strategies that attempt to make the distractors look like the suspect. At the 
same time, the match-to-description-but-maximize-propitious-heterogeneity 
strategy manages to secure accurate identification rates comparable to those 
in a lineup biased against the guilty suspect. Readers are encouraged to read 
the Luus and Wells (1991) article for a more detailed analysis of the theoretical 
underpinnings of this important aspect of selecting distractors as well as an 
analysis of special problems that can arise. 
Recommendation 5: Separate lineups should be conducted for each eyewitness 
in multiple-witness cases. Minimally, the positioning of the suspect and foils 
should be different for each lineup; in some cases different distractors should 
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be used. The primary rationale for conducting separate lineups is to maintain 
some potentially critical elements of independence in the identification re-
sponses of the eyewitnesses. 
By separate lineups, we mean not only that the eyewitnesses should not as 
a group view the lineup, but also that they should not view a lineup at the 
same time even if they are in separate viewing rooms. The rationale for this 
concern is that any bias in the lineup that might result from an unusual 
occurrence or the positioning of the suspect would replicate itself across each 
of the eyewitnesses. Separately conducted lineups, on the other hand, allow 
the suspect to be placed in more than one position in the lineup. If several 
eyewitnesses identify the suspect under conditions where he or she appears 
in a different lineup position for each eyewitness, then our certainty that the 
suspect was identified for reasons other than superficial features such as po-
sition in the lineup should increase. Changing the position of the suspect in 
the lineup also helps prevent more direct forms of interwitness influence, such 
as one witness telling another which person in the lineup is the suspect. 
In general, Recommendation 5 follows from Proposition II and more spe-
cifically from the corollary to Proposition II. Recall that this corollary likens 
a lineup to a scientific experiment. In keeping with this analogy, we can have 
greater confidence in the validity of a conclusion when there is convergence 
across different measures (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Changing the position 
of the suspect and distractors for each witness is a minimum requirement for 
claiming convergence of evidence. 
In a behavioral experiment, there is a concern about the dangers of running 
several subjects who are assigned to the same experimental condition in the 
same session. The problem arises when there is a unique event that occurs 
in a given session, thereby affecting several subjects at once. Because each 
affected subject was in the same condition, it can appear that there was a 
large effect for the condition itself rather than merely a peculiar event in a 
given session. The solution in experiments is to randomly assign subjects to 
conditions within a session or to run only one subject per session (see Myers, 
1972). This same concern applies to the way lineups are conducted. If two 
or more eyewitnesses view the same lineup in the same session, even if the 
eyewitnesses are in separate viewing rooms, any peculiar events will affect 
all the eyewitnesses and their identification responses can be correlated for 
spurious reasons. 
When there are multiple eyewitnesses, there is a strong likelihood that the 
descriptions of the culprit will vary across those eyewitnesses. When this 
occurs, each eyewitness might require a different set of distractors. At the 
very least, it would be unacceptable to use one eyewitness's description of 
the culprit to select distractors for a second eyewitness if the latter's descrip-
tion were more detailed than that of the former. Suppose, for example, the 
first eyewitness described the culprit as a white male, twenty to twenty-four 
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years of age, and about six feet tall, whereas the second described the culprit 
similarly but added that he had dark, curly hair and a mole on his left cheek. 
Suppose further that the suspect was a twenty-two-year-old Caucasian male, 
six feet, one inch tall, with dark curly hair and a mole on his left cheek. In 
this case, it is permissible to use the shorter description to select distractors 
only for the first witness. The second witness must have distractors who match 
the second witness's description. 
Recommendation 6: The lineup administrator should not be aware of which 
person in the lineup is the suspect and which persons are distractors. We realize 
this recommendation might be difficult to follow in small police departments, 
but we see no reason why larger police departments cannot follow this prac-
tice. The recommendation follows from Proposition II in general and its 
corollary in particular. In the experimental analogy, this recommendation 
parallels the rationale for keeping experimenters blind to experimental con-
ditions (Rosenthal, 1967). 
That there are expectancy effects, wherein the experimenters' hypotheses, 
hunches, or desires for obtaining a particular response from a research subject 
affect the likelihood of obtaining such responses, is not in doubt. Rosenthal 
and Rubin (1978) conducted a meta-analysis of 345 studies of expectancy 
effects and found a mean correlation of r-33 between experimenters' expec-
tations and subjects' behaviors under conditions where the expectations alone 
were the causal agents. 
Fanselow (1975) demonstrated that the lineup administrator's nonverbal 
behaviors can influence eyewitness identification responses. In Fanselow's 
study subject witnesses viewed a photo lineup in which the lineup adminis-
trator was instructed to smile and show approval of a certain photograph. 
Although none of the photos was of the person in question, this nonverbal 
behavior led to an increased rate of selecting that photograph. 
Recommendation 7: The eyewitness should be told explicitly that the perpe-
trator might or might not be in the lineup. This statement should be made when 
the eyewitness is initially asked to view a lineup and again just prior to viewing 
the lineup. Many eyewitnesses seem to approach a lineup with the assumption 
that the culprit is in the lineup and that their task is to decide which lineup 
member is the culprit (Malpass & Devine, 1981; Wells, 1984). This assump-
tion, which we will call the culprit-present fallacy, has very serious conse-
quences. Any lineup, even if it does not include the actual culprit, will have 
someone who more closely resembles him or her than do the other lineup 
members. Given that the culprit is not in the lineup, the culprit-present fallacy 
reinforces the already pervasive tendency to make relative judgments and 
identify the person who shows the closest resemblance to the culprit relative 
to the other lineup members. 
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Although telling the eyewitness that the perpetrator in question might or 
might not be in the lineup does not fully eliminate eyewitnesses' reliance 
on relative judgments (Wells, 1984; Wells, 1992), it does reduce the like-
lihood that they will select someone from a culprit-absent lineup (Malpass 
& Devine, 1981). This reduction in mistaken identification rates for culprit-
absent lineups as a function of the "might or might not be present" in-
struction does not produce an appreciable decline in the likelihood that the 
culprit will be identified from a culprit-present lineup (Malpass & Devine, 
1981). 
The logic behind the "might or might not be present" recommendation is 
so powerful and important that it seems unlikely that anyone could seriously 
debate the necessity of including the statement. At the same time, however, 
police often approach a given lineup task with a firm belief that the suspect 
is the culprit in question. In a given case, for instance, the police might have 
definitive evidence against the suspect but be unable to use that evidence for 
some reason and, hence, need an identification from the eyewitness. In such 
circumstances, it might be difficult for them to "remember" to tell the eye-
witness that the actual culprit might or might not be present. Although un-
derstandable perhaps, such forgetfulness is totally unacceptable. The 
eyewitness must understand the situation as one in which the actual culprit 
might not be in the lineup. 
Recommendation 8: The eyewitness should first be asked to indicate whether 
or not the culprit is present in the lineup and only if the eyewitness makes an 
affirmative response should he or she be asked to indicate which lineup member 
is the culprit in question. This recommendation is consistent with Recom-
mendation 7 in that the initial question to the eyewitness does not presume 
the culprit is among the lineup members. If the lineup administrator were 
first to tell the eyewitness that the culprit might or might not be present and 
then immediately ask which person is the culprit, the eyewitness has not been 
given a proper opportunity to act on a belief that the culprit is not among 
the lineup members. The lineup situation can have considerable demand 
characteristics that lead eyewitnesses to feel they are not doing their job or 
helping the cause of justice if they fail to identify someone. Eyewitnesses 
need to know that "he's not there" or "I don't know" are acceptable re-
sponses. In general, Recommendation 8 can be considered a derivation from 
the corollary to Proposition II. Recall that this corollary likens a lineup task 
to a behavioral science experiment; if we are interested in measuring some-
one's beliefs, we must not imply with our procedures that some responses 
are better than others. 
Recommendation 9: If an eyewitness identifies someone from the lineup, the 
eyewitness should be asked how certain he or she is that the identified person 
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is the culprit. This question should immediately follow the identification re-
sponse so that no extraneous factors can influence the eyewitness's statement 
of certainty. There is a large body of empirical research showing that the 
certainty expressed by an eyewitness is poorly related to accuracy of identi-
fication (for example, Brigham, Maass, Snyder & Spaulding, 1982; Cutler, 
Penrod, & Martens, 1987a; Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987b; Cutler, Pen-
rod, O'Rourke, & Martens, 1987; Fleet, Brigham, & Bothwell, 1987; Gor-
enstein & Ellsworth, 1980; Greenberg, Wilson, Ruback, & Mills, 1979; 
Hilgendorf & Irving, 1978; Hosch & Cooper, 1982; Hosch, Leippe, Mar-
chioni, & Cooper, 1984; Jenkins & Davies, 1985; Kassin, 1985; Krafka & 
Penrod, 1985; Leippe, Wells, & Ostrom, 1978; Lindsay & Wells, 1986; Lind-
say, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Malpass & Devine, 1981a; Malpass & Devine 
1981b; Murray & Wells, 1982; Pigott & Brigham, 1985; Sanders & Warnick, 
1980; Sanders & Warnick, 1981; Shepherd, Ellis, & Davies, 1982; Smith, 
Kassin, & Ellsworth, 1989; Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981; Wells & 
Leippe, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979; Yuille & McEwan, 1985). 
Hence, some experts might argue that we should not recommend asking 
eyewitnesses about their certainty of identification because it has proven to 
be a misleading index of accuracy. 
Nevertheless, we recommend that a confidence statement be secured from 
the eyewitness for two reasons. First, the empirical literature indicates that 
an eyewitness's statement of confidence immediately following an identifi-
cation can have some diagnostic value, albeit perhaps to a trivial degree. 
Later, however, an eyewitness is likely to have his or her confidence influenced 
by extramemorial factors, thereby confusing the issue of how to interpret 
later statements of confidence. Second, triers of fact are going to use eye-
witness confidence to infer something about the accuracy of the eyewitness 
regardless of whether the confidence statement is taken immediately following 
the identification or at some later time. Hence, we suggest that a confidence 
statement be taken at the time of identification so that whatever confidence 
level the eyewitness expresses is relatively clean of the extraneous influences 
that can occur later. 
In another chapter in this volume (Lu us and Wells), the issue of the relation 
between confidence and accuracy is discussed in greater detail. The general 
point is that there are numerous, relatively uncontrollable events that can 
occur subsequent to an eyewitness's identification that serve to confound later 
statements about how confident he or she is in the identification. For example, 
if the eyewitness mentally rehearses the image of the identified person and 
is motivated to resist being influenced by cross examination, his or her ap-
parent confidence on the witness stand might increase dramatically even if 
the identification is incorrect (Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981). An eye-
witness's confidence in a false identification has been shown to increase dra-
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matically by telling him or her that another eyewitness has identified the same 
person (Luus & Wells, 1992). Similarly one can imagine the difficulty an 
eyewitness might have if, following an identification, he or she is told that 
the identified person's fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime. If 
the eyewitness were not asked until after receiving this extramemorial infor-
mation how confident he or she is in his or her identification, can the external 
information be ignored? What does it mean if the eyewitness now says he or 
she is highly confident in the identification? 
Recommendation 9 follows generally from Proposition II, which states that 
eyewitness responses can be influenced by extramemorial factors. Although 
we commonly think about the ways extramemorial factors might influence 
the identification decision, we must also be concerned with the ways in which 
extramemorial factors can influence postidentification judgments such as 
eyewitness confidence. 
For these reasons we recommend that any identification decision be 
followed almost immediately with a question about how confident the witness 
is in that identification. Under no circumstances would it be appropriate to 
express pleasure or displeasure to the eyewitness, or "inform" the eyewitness 
in any way until the confidence statement is secured. Some might argue 
that it is unrealistic to assume that a lineup administrator can avoid re-
sponding nonverbally with pleasure or displeasure following an eyewitness's 
identification decision. We do not need to presuppose some kind of su-
perhuman quality of a lineup administrator (who is somehow immune to 
nonverbal leakage), however, as long as Recommendation 6 is followed. 
Recall that Recommendation 6 states that the lineup administrator should 
not be aware of which lineup member is the suspect and which are dis-
tractors. 
Recommendation 10: All phases and aspects of the lineup should be meticu-
lously recorded, preferably using videotape. The common practice of merely 
having a photograph of the lineup (or a copy of the photo spread), with some 
notes and forms filled out by the lineup administrator, should no longer be 
considered an acceptable record. These notes are almost always incomplete 
and there is considerable doubt at times about how such things as oral in-
structions to eyewitnesses were delivered as later reported in the police of-
ficer's notes. 
Given the pervasive accessibility and ease of operation of video recording 
equipment today, there seems little excuse for not videotaping the instructions 
that were given to the eyewitness, the lineup, the questions asked of the 
eyewitness, the eyewitness's identification response, and the eyewitness's 
statement of confidence. Ultimately, it will be up to the courts to decide 
whether or not a copy of such tapes should be given routinely to defense 
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counsel or whether this should happen only on a case by case basis by petition 
and argument from defense counsel. There can be no doubt, however, of the 
potential utility of videotaping lineup procedures. 
Acceptable variations in lineup methods 
The standard lineup procedure is one in which a suspect is embedded among 
distractors and the entire set of lineup members is presented at one time to 
the eyewitness. In recent years, variations on this method have been tested 
empirically. Wells (1984), for example, proposed a dual lineup procedure in 
which one lineup contains the suspect and the other does not. Wells argued 
that the dual lineup procedure is psychologically different from a larger lineup 
that simply joins these two separate lineups. This is especially true when the 
eyewitness is unaware that there will be two lineups. Under these conditions, 
any propensities of eyewitnesses to make an identification based on relative 
judgments (who looks most like the culprit relative to the other lineup mem-
bers) will be detected because all members of the first lineup are innocent 
distractors. The empirical data show that this procedure, called the blank-
lineup control, is an effective "lure" or "screen" for weeding out unreliable 
eyewitnesses. 
We endorse the blank-lineup control procedure, but we hesitate to make 
it one of our explicit recommendations for two reasons. First, it may be unduly 
costly for police to construct two lineups for each eyewitness. Second, wide-
spread practice of the blank-lineup control procedure could result in the 
practice becoming known to the general population. We could imagine, for 
instance, eyewitnesses always skipping over the first lineup because they have 
somehow learned that the suspect always appears in the second lineup. 
Another variation on standard lineup procedures is the sequential lineup, 
proposed originally by Lindsay & Wells (1985). The sequential lineup presents 
one lineup member at a time and the eyewitness is asked to make a decision 
(is this person the culprit?) of yes or no for each person viewed at the time 
of initial presentation. The theoretical idea behind the sequential procedure 
stems from Wells's (1984) relative-judgment conceptualization. Specifically, 
it is argued that the eyewitness who is confronted with the sequential lineup 
task cannot fall back on mere relative judgments because the set of possible 
relative comparisons is incomplete. The eyewitness might be able to say that 
a given person (for example, number three in the sequence) is a relatively 
better likeness than were the ones previously viewed, but he or she cannot 
be certain that a yet-to-be-viewed lineup member is not perhaps an even 
better likeness relative to the one being viewed now. Hence, by forcing the 
eyewitness to make a yes or no decision for each lineup member without 
knowing what the remaining members look like, the eyewitness is forced away 
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from relative judgments and made to rely more on an absolute comparison 
between the lineup member being viewed at the time and his or her memory 
of the culprit. 
There is considerable consistent empirical support for the superiority of 
the sequential method over the simultaneous method (for example, Cutler & 
Penrod, 1988; Lindsay et al., in press; Lindsay et al., 1991; Lindsay & Wells, 
1985; Parker & Ryan, 1990; Sporer, 1990). Nevertheless, we are not yet 
prepared to recommend that all lineups be conducted sequentially. Although 
we anticipate that the sequential procedure will be widely advocated by eye-
witness experts within the decade, we worry that police departments that do 
not or cannot implement Recommendation 6 (lineup administrator kept blind 
as to which person is the suspect) might create more problems with the 
sequential procedure than they would with the simultaneous procedure. Our 
fear is that a lineup administrator might more effectively "communicate" 
(either intentionally or unintentionally) the identity of the suspect to the 
eyewitness with the sequential procedure than with the simultaneous proce-
dure. In general, we endorse the sequential lineup whenever the lineup ad-
ministrator can be kept blind as to which lineup member is the suspect; but 
if it is impractical, or if it is questionable whether the lineup administrator is 
truly blind in this regard, we believe that a simultaneous procedure may be 
safer. 
Conclusions 
We have argued that eyewitness error is a joint product of inherent human 
cognitive limitations and the methods that are used to obtain information 
from eyewitnesses. We now have a number of relatively specific recommen-
dations about the best ways to conduct lineup identification tasks so as to 
minimize the rate of false identifications and maximize rates of accurate iden-
tification. We have tried to show how the principal recommendations we 
made in this chapter can be tied back to two simple, overreaching proposi-
tions: A lineup is conducted for the purpose of obtaining information with a 
recognition task that was not available using a recall task; the identification 
process is governed not only by memorial processes but also by extramemorial 
factors. Recommendations 1 through 9, each of which has empirical support, 
can be said to derive from one or both of these general propositions. We 
believe that there are other important recommendations that can be derived 
from these propositions and tested empirically; we trust these recommen-
dations will be refined and new ones added in the next few years. Meanwhile, 
it seems that we have a practical body of research that can help reduce what 
we believe to be a significant problem in police practice. 
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Notes 
We use the term lineup here to refer to live presentations of suspects and distractors as well 
as photographic spreads and videotaped methods of presentation. 
2 See Wells & Luus (1990) for a more detailed treatment of the analogy. 
3 Police sometimes call dis tractors "fillers." In the eyewitness literature they are sometimes 
called foils. 
4 The actual odds are higher assuming there is some probability that the culprit is not in the 
lineup at all. 
5 The actual odds are lower assuming there is some probability that the suspect is in fact the 
culprit. 
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